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Secure Quantum Bit Commitment Using Unstable Particles
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Using unstable particles which decay by emitting neutrinos, we propose a quantum bit commit-
ment protocol that is humanly impossible to break. Neutrinos carry away quantum information,
but their interaction with matter is so weak that it would take an astronomically-sized machine
just to catch them, not to mention performing controlled unitary operations on them. As a result
quantum information is lost, and cheating is not possible even if the participants had access to the
most powerful quantum computers that could ever be built. Therefore, for all practical purposes,
our new protocol is as good as unconditionally secure.
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Bit commitment is a simple cryptographic pro-
tocol involving two parties, customarily named Al-
ice and Bob. Alice commits to Bob a secret bit
b ∈ {0, 1} that is to be revealed at some later time.
In order to ensure Bob that she will keep her com-
mitment, Alice provides Bob with a piece of evidence
with which he can verify her honesty when she un-
veils. The security of bit commitment is an impor-
tant issue because it can be used to implement other
more complicated cryptographic protocols [1].
A bit commitment protocol is secure if it satis-
fies the following two conditions. (1) Concealing:
Bob cannot determine the value of b before Alice
unveils it; (2) Binding: Alice cannot change b with-
out Bob’s knowledge. Furthermore, if the protocol
remains secure even if Alice and Bob had capabilities
limited only by the laws of nature (this is sometimes
referred to as the parties having unlimited compu-
tational power), then it is said to be unconditionally
secure.
Consider a simple example. Alice writes down her
bit b on a piece of paper and locks it in a box, which
she gives to Bob as evidence of her commitment.
She unveils by announcing the value of b and giv-
ing the key to Bob for verification. This protocol
seems secure because Alice cannot change the bit
without access to the box, and Bob cannot open the
box without the key. However as with other classical
cryptographic schemes, it is not unconditionally se-
cure, because, e.g., Bob’s ability to open the box by
himself is not in violation of any natural laws. By
introducing quantum mechanics into the bit com-
mitment game, one hopes to achieve unconditional
security which is guaranteed by the laws of nature.
In a quantum bit commitment (QBC) protocol, Al-
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ice and Bob execute a series of quantum and clas-
sical operations, which results in a quantum state
with density matrix ρ
(b)
B in Bob’s hand. If
ρ
(0)
B = ρ
(1)
B , (1)
then the protocol is perfect concealing, and Bob is
not able to extract any information about the value
of b from ρ
(b)
B . That means b is encoded in the rep-
resentation of ρ
(b)
B . In the unveiling phase, Alice is
required to specify the representation so that Bob
can check if she is honest.
It is generally accepted that unconditionally se-
cure quantum bit commitment is ruled out as a mat-
ter of principle. This is due to a 1997 no-go theorem
[2, 3] which states that, if Alice and Bob have access
to quantum computers, then no QBC protocol can
be concealing and binding at the same time. Fur-
thermore, it has been shown recently that this is the
case even if Bob employs secret parameters unknown
to Alice [4, 5].
Given the fact that unconditionally secure QBC
is ruled out in theory, it does not follow, however,
that all protocols are breakable within human capa-
bilities. This is relevant because QBC is a crypto-
graphic task meant to be implemented in the real
world; so if the security of a protocol is humanly
impossible to break, then practically it is as good
as unconditionally secure, even though it is not in
the mathematical sense. The purpose of this paper
is to show that the laws of physics permit a level of
security which is not jeopardized by even the most
powerful possible quantum computers.
Before proceeding further, we briefly review the
original arguments leading to the no-go result for the
perfect concealing case [2, 3]. (For the near-perfect
case where ρ
(0)
B ≈ ρ(1)B , see Refs. [2, 3, 4].) The
crucial ingredient is the observation that the whole
commitment process, which may involve any num-
2ber of rounds of quantum and classical exchanges
between Alice and Bob, can be represented by an
unitary transformation U (b)AB on some initial pure
state |φ(b)AB〉. Therefore at the end of the commit-
ment phase, there exists a pure state
|Ψ(b)AB〉 = U (b)AB|φ(b)AB〉 (2)
in the combined Hilbert space HA⊗HB of Alice and
Bob, instead of just a mixed state ρ
(b)
B in HB. |Ψ(b)AB〉
is called a quantum purification of ρ
(b)
B , such that
TrA |Ψ(b)AB〉〈Ψ(b)AB | = ρ(b)B , (3)
where the trace is over Alice’s share of the state.
In this approach, all undisclosed parameters are left
undetermined at the quantum level. Note that the
implementation of U (b)AB in general requires Alice and
Bob to have access to quantum computers, which is
consistent with the assumption that they have un-
limited computational power.
The concealing condition, Eq. (1), together with
Schmidt decomposition theorem [6, 7], implies that
|Ψ(0)AB〉 and |Ψ(1)AB〉 can be written as
|Ψ(0)AB〉 =
∑
i
√
λi |eiA〉 ⊗ |ψiB〉, (4)
|Ψ(1)AB〉 =
∑
i
√
λi |f iA〉 ⊗ |ψiB〉, (5)
where {|eiA〉}, {|f iA〉}, and {|ψiB}〉 are orthonormal
bases inHA andHB as indicated. Notice that |Ψ(0)AB〉
and |Ψ(1)AB〉 are identical except for the bases {|eiA〉}
and {|f iA〉}, which are related by an unitary operator
UA:
|f iA〉 = UA|eiA〉. (6)
Hence we also have
|Ψ(1)AB〉 = UA|Ψ(0)AB〉. (7)
It is important to note that UA acts on HA only so
that Alice can implement it without Bob’s help. It
then follows that she can cheat with the following
sure-win strategy (called EPR attack). Alice always
commits to b = 0 in the beginning. Later on if she
wants to keep her initial commitment, she simply
follows the protocol honestly to the end. Otherwise
if she wants to switch to b = 1 instead, she only
needs to apply UA to the qubits in her control, and
then proceeds as if she had committed to b = 1 in the
first place. Bob would conclude that Alice is honest
in either case, because his density matrix ρ
(b)
B is not
affected by the transformation UA. Therefore, if a
QBC protocol is concealing, it cannot be binding at
the same time.
Notice that, in the impossibility proof outlined
above, it is implicitly assumed that Alice can main-
tain full control over her share of the pure state
|Ψ(b)AB〉 indefinitely after the end of the commitment
phase. This is however not possible if the protocol
involves unstable particles which can carry quantum
information only for a finite period of time. Con-
sider, for example, the neutron (n) which decays
spontaneously via weak interaction (β-decay) into
a proton (p), an electron (e), and an anti-electron
neutrino (ν¯e),
n→ p+ e+ ν¯e, (8)
with a mean lifetime of τn = 885.7 seconds [8]. If
Alice is required to take certain action on a neutron,
it is very unlikely that she could maintain full control
over the resulting state for a period much longer
than a few τn’s.
One might argue that, by coherent manipulation
of the decay products, it is still possible to control
the spin of the neutron after it decays. This is in
principle true. However to do so, one must be able to
preserve the coherence between the decay products
and the rest of the system for an indefinite length
of time, which is practically impossible. The rea-
son is that the wave functions of the light particles
(e and ν¯e) propagate outward in all directions at
near light-speed c, so that the volume containing
the decay fragments increases with time as (ct)3,
which would soon encloses the entire earth. More-
over there will be numerous neutrons decaying into
the same volume, and one would have to be able
to identify and manipulate the wave functions origi-
nating from a single neutron, without disturbing the
others. On top of this, an even more serious problem
is that the (anti-)neutrino participates in weak inter-
actions only. Its interaction with matter is so weak
that a “neutrino passing through the entire earth has
less than one chance in a thousand billion of being
stopped by terrestrial matter” [9]. That means, on
the one hand, the earth is not likely to cause deco-
herence to the anti-neutrino. On the other hand, one
would need a detector a thousand billion times the
size of the earth just to catch a particular neutrino,
not to mention a machine to perform controlled uni-
tary transformations on it. And there are additional
complications, e.g., neutrinos change identities due
to flavor oscillations [10]. Certainly, by measuring
the momenta of the electron and the proton, one
could determine the momentum and spin direction
of ν¯e, without actually detecting ν¯e itself. However
this operation is neither controlled nor unitary, and
hence is not useful to the cheating party. From the
above discussion, we conclude that, for all practi-
3cal purposes, the quantum information carried by a
neutron is lost after it decays.
Besides the neutron, there are many other natu-
rally occurring or artificial weakly decaying particles
with different lifetimes. For example, the muon (µ)
and the Cobalt-60 nucleus ( 60Co) are also unstable
against β-decay with mean lifetimes of 2.2×e−6 sec-
ond [8] and 5.3 years [13] respectively.
In the QBC protocol to be proposed below, we
shall generically call the weakly decaying particleW ,
which could be an elementary particle or atomic nu-
cleus. The W carries spin J 6= 0, and it beta decays
into a daughter particle w,
W → w + e+ ν¯e, (9)
with a mean lifetime τw. For simplicity, and with-
out loss of generality, we shall take J = 1/2. As
we shall see, the security of this protocol is guaran-
teed by the laws of physics, independent of whether
quantum computers are available or not. Let N be
the security parameter, and
|+ zˆ〉 = |0〉, | − zˆ〉 = |1〉, (10)
| ± xˆ〉 = 1√
2
(
|0〉 ± |1〉
)
. (11)
The new protocol is specified as follows.
Commitment phase:
1. Bob sends Alice an ordered sequence of N sta-
ble qubits, each drawn independently from the
set
B = {|+ zˆ〉, | − zˆ〉, |+ xˆ〉, | − xˆ〉} (12)
with even probability.
2. To commit to b = 0, Alice keeps the stable
qubits intact. For b = 1, she swaps the states
of the stable qubits into N unstable W -states,
and measures the momentum of the electron
emitted from each W when it decays.
Unveiling phase:
1. Alice unveils the value of b. For b = 0, she
sends the N stable qubits back to Bob in the
original order. For b = 1, she announces
the electron data obtained previously from her
measurements. To ensure the security of the
protocol, unveiling should take place after a
finite fraction of the W ’s has theoretically de-
cayed.
2. Bob verifies Alice’s honesty. If b = 0, he checks
if the states of the stable qubits are the same
as before. If b = 1, he calculates the electron
asymmetry using Alice’s data as follows. Let
eˆi be the polarization vector of the i-th W ,
where
eˆi ∈ {+zˆ,−zˆ,+xˆ,−xˆ} (13)
corresponding respectively to the four states in
the set B. ~pi is the momentum of the electron
emitted by the i-th W , and
θi = cos
−1
(
eˆi · ~pi/|~pi|
)
. (14)
Let n(θ, p) be the number of events for which
θi = θ and |~pi| = p, then the asymmetry
A(θ, p) is given by
A(θ, p) =
n(θ, p)− n(π − θ, p)
n(θ, p) + n(π − θ, p) . (15)
A(θ, p) should reproduce the known experi-
mental results for all θ and p, otherwise Alice
is cheating.
Before proceeding to analyze the security of the
protocol, let us first explain the physics behind Eq.
(15). Consider a collection of W ’s polarized along
eˆ. Let ~σ be the spin operator of the W , and ~p the
electron momentum, with eˆ · ~p/|~p | = cos(θ). Then
n(θ, p) is a measure of the expectation value of the
operator ~σ · ~p in the decay process, namely,
n(θ, p) ∝ 〈~σ · ~p 〉. (16)
Under parity inversion, ~p changes sign, but the spin
operator ~σ does not; hence ~σ·~p is a parity-odd (pseu-
doscalar) operator. If parity is conserved in β-decay,
we must have
〈~σ · ~p 〉 = 〈~σ · (−~p )〉, (17)
which implies
n(θ, p) = n(π − θ, p), (18)
and consequently A(θ, p) = 0 for all θ and p. In real-
ity, parity is maximally violated in weak interactions
which is the underlying mechanism behind β-decay
[11, 12]. Hence if the data provided by Alice are
genuine, Bob would find A(θ, p) 6= 0. Otherwise, if
she assigned the electron momentum ~pi randomly by
hand, then Bob would obtain the parity conserving
result of A(θ, p) = 0, which is a signal of cheating.
It is trivial to prove that the protocol is conceal-
ing. Let |Φαβ〉 be the total state produced by Bob,
where α denotes the stable qubits to be sent to Alice,
and β the ancillas if any. After sending the α-sector
to Alice, Bob’s density matrix is given by
ρ
β
= Trα|Φαβ〉〈Φαβ |. (19)
4Clearly whatever Alice does to commit, the reduced
density matrix on Bob’s side is unaffected. Hence at
the end of the commitment phase,
ρ
(0)
B = ρ
(1)
B = ρβ , (20)
and the protocol is perfectly concealing.
Next we prove that it is binding. As explained
before, the quantum information carried by a W is
practically lost after its decay. It follows that if Alice
first commits to b = 1 and changes her mind after a
finite fraction of the W ’s has decayed, her chance of
escaping Bob’s detection is exponentially small.
The question remains, if Alice first commits to
b = 0, could she change to b = 1 without Bob’s
knowledge? Obviously the only way to proceed is
to swap the states of the stable particles into un-
stable W ’s, and wait for them to decay. However
she cannot postpone her decision until the very last
moment, because the W ’s take time to decay. Sup-
pose Bob wants to bind Alice to her commitment
for a period no shorter than T , then the following
arrangement is sufficient, though not unique. Bob
instructs Alice to use a kind of unstable particles
with mean lifetime τw = 10T , and Alice unveils 2T
after the conclusion of the commitment procedure.
In this situation, if Alice commits to b = 1 at the
beginning, then by the time she unveils the average
number of W ’s decayed is given by
δN(2T ) = N(1− e−0.2). (21)
However if she first commits to b = 0, and changes
her mind at a time T before unveiling, then the num-
ber of recorded decay events would be smaller:
δN(T ) = N(1− e−0.1). (22)
That means, to unveil b = 1, Alice would have to ar-
tificially generate δN(2T )− δN(T ) ≈ N/10 electron
momentum data. It is important to note that these
artificial data contribute to the denominator but not
the numerator of Eq. (15). As a result, Bob would
obtain an asymmetry which is smaller than what it
should be by a factor of
F = δN(T )/δN(2T ) ≈ 1/2. (23)
In an ideal world where there are no systematic er-
rors, and statistical errors can be made as small as
desired, a 1/2 reduction in A(θ, p) is a clean and
clear signal of cheating by Alice. One can readily
show that, for any typical (θ, p), the chance of ob-
taining the correct A(θ, p) by statistical fluctuation
is exponentially small for large N . This concludes
the proof that our new protocol is secure. We em-
phasize that it would remain secure even if Alice had
access to the most powerful quantum computer that
could ever be built.
In summary, we have constructed a QBC protocol
where some of the particles involved are unstable.
Unstable particles can carry quantum information
only for a finite period of time, and this property
turns out to be useful in constructing secure QBC
protocols. The idea is that the spontaneous decay-
ing of the unstable particles may render the asso-
ciated quantum information uncontrollable. If so,
then cheating by EPR attack becomes impossible.
In the case of any weakly decaying particles emitting
neutrinos, controlling the decay products in a coher-
ent manner would require an astronomically-sized
quantum computer operating on neutrinos, which
is clearly beyond the human capability to build.
Therefore, for all practical purposes, our protocol
is as good as unconditionally secure.
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